Monday, April 16, 2012

I can relate


Hulk REASON!

8 March 2011 - Are governments smarter than a 5th grader?

Colleagues,

My daughter is in Grade 5.  The Ontario Ministry of Education Grade 5 curriculum includes “conservation of energy” as a topic, and last week she came home with a project called “Energy Home Audit.”  The goal of this project, according to the printed evaluation rubric that accompanied it, is to examine potential areas of waste and try to define ways to use energy more efficiently – including through upgrading equipment in the home.

This is a laudable goal, to be sure, and it’s an area where my wife and I have more than a little expertise.  When I went through our house with my daughter to tot up where we’ve made energy-saving alterations in the past 18 months, the results were a little startling.  We had:

·         installed an Energy Star washer, dryer and refrigerator;

·         completed an EcoEnergy audit to identify potential problem areas with the house (happily there were very few);

·         replaced a contractor-grade (that’s industry code for “lousy”) natural gas furnace with a high-efficiency condensing industrial boiler driving two hydronic air handlers (a triple-zoned air handler for the main living areas and a single-zone air handler for the basement) controlled by programmable web-enabled thermostats;

·         replaced a rented natural gas hot water heater with a hot water storage tank driven by the boiler;

·         installed several thousand square feet of radiant in-floor heating (again, driven by the boiler); and,

·         installed four sealed evacuated solar panels driving a 120-gallon storage tank and a PEX-limestone heat sink under the garage floor to provide auxiliary heat to augment the boiler.

In addition to this, we’ve gotten rid of the contractor-grade (i.e., lousy) 4-ton air conditioner that came with the house, and later this spring we will be installing an experimental cold-climate air-source heat pump driven by a digital modulating scroll compressor that will handle our cooling needs, and that should operate down to -25ºC in heating mode.  Oh, and I’m slowly replacing conventional incandescent bulbs in high-usage areas with LED bulbs – although at $35 a pop for 50W-equivalent spotlights, this is a long-term project.

So there was a lot for my daughter to report on.  What annoyed me about the project instructions, though, was this line from paragraph four: “Imagine that cost is not a problem.”  My daughter’s response to this brilliant piece of pedagogical direction was, “That doesn’t make any sense!” 

No, it certainly doesn’t, and there's something amusing in the fact that a 5th grader can understand this but a load of Education Ministry pedagogues don't.  But we shouldn't be surprised; after all, failure to understand the need to integrate conversion costs over equipment lifetime is a depressingly pervasive theme where alternative energy is concerned.  As you can imagine from that list above – hell, as you can imagine from the LED bulbs alone! – cost is very much a problem.  For the average home-owner, it’s the single most important problem.  After all, the cheapest thing for me to do would have been to leave the old furnace and air conditioner in place and simply tolerate the lack of comfort and functionality and the higher fuel and electricity bills that come with older technology.  Determining whether an upgrade makes sense requires performing a cost-benefit analysis, which in turn requires knowing something about basic arithmetic.  This is something that seems to be unfamiliar to many homeowners.  Regrettably, it also seems to be something that is entirely foreign to governments – and unfortunately, government decision-makers seem all too ready to adopt the Education Ministry’s advice to “imagine that cost is not a problem.”

What it all boils down to is this: will your investment in alternative energy pay off over the life expectancy of the equipment?  LED light bulbs are an excellent example.  I recently purchased four LED spotlights for my office to replace the 65-watt incandescent spotlights previously in place.  The packaging on the LED bulbs states that I will save “over $100” in electricity over their expected lifespan.  That’s easy enough to check.  My office lights are on in the mornings from 0400-0800, and in the evenings from 1700-2300.  That’s 40 off-peak hours and 30 mid-peak hours per week in the summer, and in the winter, 35 off-peak hours, 10 mid-peak hours, and 25 on-peak hours.(Note E)  With 4 x 65 Watt incandescent bulbs, the office lighting load was 260 Watts, or 0.26 kW; with 4 x Philips PAR38 13-Watt LED bulbs, the aggregate load is 52 Watts, or 0.052 kW.(Note F) 

Table 1 – Bulbous Comparisons

INCANDESCENT BULBS

LOAD
Summer
Winter
Summer
Winter
$/kWh
COST
Off-peak
0.26
40
35
270.4
236.6
0.051
 $   12.07
Mid-peak
0.26
30
10
202.8
67.6
0.081
 $    5.48
On-peak
0.26

25
0
169
0.099
 $   16.73
ANNUAL TOTAL
 $   34.27
LED BULBS

LOAD
Summer
Winter
Summer
Winter
$/kWh
COST
Off-peak
0.052
40
35
54.08
47.32
0.051
 $    2.41
Mid-peak
0.052
30
10
40.56
13.52
0.081
 $    1.10
On-peak
0.052

25
0
33.8
0.099
 $    3.35
ANNUAL TOTAL 
 $    6.85

This means that by replacing my office lights with LED bulbs, my electricity savings should be $27.42 per year.  Since four of those bulbs cost $35.00 each plus tax, the total installation cost was $158.20.  This means that the payback period for the bulbs is 5.77 years.  If the bulbs burn out before that point, I’ve lost money; if they burn out after that point, I get to start saving money.  This is a critical point to remember – nobody “saves” any money on alternative energy until after the cost of conversion has been recovered.

Now we come to the question of life expectancy.  According to the manufacturer, the bulbs are supposed to be good for 45,000 hours.  Since I’m using them for 70 hours per week, 52 weeks per year (a total of 3640 hours per annum), they should – in theory – last for 12.36 years.  This means that I will begin saving money after the payback period ends and until the bulbs’ life expectancy expires, or for an expected total of 6.59 years.  At an annual savings of $27.42, I should save $180, or about $45 per bulb over their expected lifespan.  Not quite the >$100 savings claimed on the packaging, but I suppose that if I used them more during peak periods (e.g. if they were left on in an office through the whole of a 10-hour active day), or if we lived in an area with higher overall electricity rates, the savings would be correspondingly greater.

So - fingers crossed - they ought to be a good deal.  Now, let’s look at a larger-scale example – the case of “Wind One”, a 1.65 MW wind turbine recently installed in Falmouth, Massachusetts.(Note A)  The article on the turbine originally caught my eye because of complaints by nearby residents of physical and psychological symptoms resulting from living within a quarter-mile of the thing.  I can sympathize; in 2009 my family and I stopped for a lunch break in the middle of a western Jutland turbine field, and let me tell you, I know what the residents of Falmouth are talking about.  The Heathrow tarmac is more restful than a large wind farm.  But what really caught my attention in the article was this line:

Wind One is expected to save the town about $375,000 a year in electricity. Heather Harper, Falmouth’s acting town manager, says Falmouth owes about $5 million on the 1.65-megawatt turbine.

“Payback Period” is the amount you owe divided by your annual savings.  On the face of it, the payback period for Wind One is 13.33 years.  Except that it’s not, because the chances that the town of Falmouth paid cash for the thing are precisely zero; at an interest rate of 7%, it’s more like 17 years before the thing is paid off and the town of Falmouth starts “saving” any money.

According to the US Energy Information Administration, the weighted average wholesale price for electricity in New England for the past month has ranged from a low of $40.23/MWh to a high of $102.85/MWh (dividing by a thousand gives you the price per kWh, naturally, so this ranges from $0.04023 to $0.10285, which shows that even at the highest power purchase rate, given an average US electricity price of $0.11-$0.12/kWh, the companies are still making money).(Note B)  In order to “save” Falmouth $375,000 per year, therefore, Wind One needs to generate 375000/40.23 = 9321 MWh per annum.  If the turbine ran at its rated capacity of 1.65 MW for 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 52 weeks a year, it would generate 39.6 MWh/day, or 14,454 MWh per annum.  In order to save $375,000 per year, as the article claims, the turbine would therefore have to run at a capacity factor of 9321/14,454 or 64.48%.  The maximum demonstrated capacity factor for large wind turbines, though, is only ~25%.(Note G)

It is impossible for Wind One to offer the kind of savings claimed in the article – and even if it could, the savings wouldn’t begin until the installation costs had been recouped, 17 years from now.

Turn the arithmetic around.  At the average capacity factor of 25%, Wind One can generate 14,454 x 0.25 = 3613.5 MWh per year.  In order to “save” $375,000 per year at that generation rate, the average price of electricity therefore has to be $103.77 per MWh or higher throughout the whole year.  But according to EIA statistics, the wholesale price of electricity in New England only reached a maximum weighted average of $102.85/MWh, and that was only for a single 3-day period out of the last month.  At a capacity factor of 25% and at the median price of $71.54/MWh for that period, the annual “savings” offered by Wind One amount to 3613.5MWh*$71.54/MWh or $258,509.79 – a third less than the city manager suggested.  At that rate, the payback period for the turbine is closer to 25 years once amortization is taken into consideration.  And remember, “savings” do not begin until you’ve paid off the installation cost.

And now life expectancy comes into the equation.  Most suppliers of large wind turbines (and most proponents of alternative energy) deem turbine life expectancy to be 20 years or more.(Note C)  These figures are not supported by data because the large-scale wind industry is less than 20 years old; and they do not take into consideration the requirement for heavy maintenance due to the unusually enormous stresses on large turbines due to the size of the equipment and the impact of wind speed variability on gearboxes, the Achilles’ Heel of large turbines.  Gas turbines do not experience this problem because operational speed is not variable.  Engineering studies by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in the US have identified high gearbox failure rates as a significant contributor to the cost of wind power – and the failure problems are endemic, not specific to individual designs or models, and are not related to poor materials or manufacturing practices (if you’re interested in a copy of this report, let me know).  Not to put too fine a point on it, but designing a gearbox to derive useful electrical power from an 8-tonne turbine the size of a football field spinning at 300 km/hr and facing a massive range of temperature and weather conditions, including unpredictable wind velocity changes, is a non-trivial engineering challenge.

A good measure of equipment reliability is whether manufacturers will put their money where their mouth is.  The large scroll compressors used in ground-source heat pumps, for example, are extremely reliable, and often carry 10-20 year warranties.  Manufacturer warranties on large wind turbines tend to be good for only two years.(Note D)  If you’re looking at alternative energy from a genuinely rational cost-benefit perspective, that ought to tell you something.  Would you buy a new car if the engine and drive train only had a two-year warranty?

What it all boils down to is this: contrary to the instructions on my daughter’s “home energy audit” project, and contrary to the demonstrated behaviour of governments that have invested in “green energy” projects, cost is in fact a major problem.  “Imagining” otherwise – as Spain, the UK, Germany, and other countries that have invested heavily in wind and solar projects have discovered to the dismay and impoverishment of their taxpayers – is the road to ruin. Honest, realistic cost-benefit analyses lie at the heart of alternative energy decision-making for homeowners, and if they don’t, then you end up paying through the nose for an awfully long time for something that doesn’t perform as promised.  You end up out of pocket.  The same principle holds true for governments.

And you only need to be as smart as a 5th grader to figure that out.

Cheers,

//Don//

P.S.  There's a funny coda to this story.  After months of complaints from nearby residents about adverse health effects, the Wind One turbine in Falmouth was shut down on 9 November 2011.  Wind Two, the follow-on turbine, was going to be operated for two months to determine whether it had adverse health effects on residents, and then shut down.  According to the Town of Falmouth's own cost estimate to remove the turbines, building them in the first place cost $9,857,000 and $2,983,000 in interest payments to date.  That's $12,8400,000, which comes to $6.47M per turbine.  So a realistic estimate for the payback period would be pushing 30 years - well beyond the expected lifespan of the equipment even if it weren't shut down in response to residents' complaints.

But hey - "assume that cost is not a factor." That's definitely what we should be teaching our 5th graders.


Notes

B) [http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/wholesale/wholesale.html]
C) e.g., [http://www.nationalwind.com/files/NationalWindTurbineFacts.pdf], [http://www.ehow.com/facts_5957998_life-wind-turbine_.html]
D) [http://www.powergenworldwide.com/index/display/articledisplay/337582/articles/power-engineering/volume-112/issue-8/features/keeping-wind-turbines-spinning.html]
E) Time of use rates for Ontario Hydro can be found here: [http://www.hydroottawa.com/residential/index.cfm?lang=e&template_id=156]
F) [http://www.ecat.lighting.philips.com/l/catalog/catalog.jsp?userLanguage=en&userCountry=us&catalogType=LP_PROF_ATG&_dyncharset=UTF-8&categoryid=LP_CF_S_LEPR38_EU_FA_US_LP_PROF_ATG&productid=929000171002_NA_US_LP_PROF_ATG&title=EnduraLED%2013W%203000K%20120V%20PAR38&ctn=929000171002_NA]
G)  According to the US EIA, the installed wind generation capacity in the US in 2008 was 24,651 MW, for a maximal annual total potential capacity of 215,942,760 MWh.  The total wind generated power in the US in 2008 was 55,363,100 MWh. This gives a capacity factor of 25.6%.  Data available at [http://www.eia.gov/renewable/data.cfm#wind]

Sunday, April 15, 2012

Misunderstanding Trends

Colleagues,

A couple of posts back (see Maunderings on Trend Projection) I talked about the difficulties inherent in attempting to project complex trends into the future.  As a student of history (and a fan of Asimov's "Foundation" series, which is based on the conceit that it may some day be possible to develop a science of long-term historical trend projection) it's a topic that's near to my heart.  As I put it in that post, when trying to figure out how a complex trend may evolve into the future, "The best we can do is work from a comprehensive knowledge of the past, and make reasonable, parsimonious, short-term predictions based on every last scrap of data we can muster."

Sometimes it's difficult, though, to illustrate clearly the problem with attempting to project trends into the future.  The biggest problem lies in trying to project trends that are influenced by factors that you don't understand and therefore haven't taken into consideration.

Then I found some pictures.  Back in 1985, Ebony magazine published an "artist's rendition" of what Michael Jackson, that year's hottest pop star, would likely look like 15 years hence.  I think the artist was influenced a little too heavily by Billy Dee Williams and Lionel Ritchie, but whatever; Mike was a good-looking kid, and, ceteris paribus, there was every reason to suspect that he'd grow into a good looking forty-year-old.

The problem with trend projection is that ceteris is never paribus.

Figure 1 - Michael Jackson, from 1985-2000: Trend Projection vs. Empirical Reality

The gulf between what Ebony thought would happen, and what really happened, could hardly be more startling.  Without casting aspersions on the character and conduct of a chap who, in his youth, was unquestionably a great artist, let's just say that there were probably a few variables in the Jackson equation that the editors of Ebony either didn't understand, or didn't want to incorporate into their equations for fear of upsetting a multi-million-dollar applecart.  Ignorance obviously played a factor - the only question is whether the ignorance was unwilling, or wilful.

Sound familiar?  Well, it does to me.  Here's another example.

Figure 2 - Global temperature, climate model projections vs. empirical reality

That chart (obtained from Steve Goddard's inimitable RealScience blog) is taken from James Hansen's late-1980s prediction of what was likely to happen to global temperatures based on human greenhouse gas emission trends.  Scenario A - the highest black dotted line - was what Hansen called "business as usual", based on a 1.5% per annum increase in atmospheric CO2, and a 3% per annum increase in aerosols.  Scenario C - the lowest black dotted line - was "zero emissions", i.e. no increase in CO2 emissions beyond the prediction date.  The red line is the temperature trend.  The red dot is the current average global temperature for 2012.

In other words, since Hansen made his climate model-based projection, the global temperature trend has been consistently well below the projected temperature for the zero-emissions scenario.  Problem is, human CO2 emissions have continued to skyrocket.  In fact they are pretty close to Scenario A.  This chart is the climate science equivalent of predicting that Michael Jackson would evolve into Billy Dee Williams, and instead watching in horror as he gradually transforms into an extra from the "Thriller" video.  And for the same reason, too: there was something wrong with the model.  Through either ignorance or wilful dismissal of obvious controlling variables (the Sun in the case of climate, and complete, lip-flipping, python-snuggling, skeleton-purchasing, looney-tunes insanity in the case of Michael Jackson), the models failed catastrophically to accurately project the outcome of the trend.

Bottom line: you can't model a trend if you don't understand the variables that influence it, and the test of any hypothesis - and that's all that any model is, an hypothesis - is how well predictions match empirical observations.  If your projections end up looking NOTHING AT ALL like measured data, then it's time to revisit your model.  One wonders whether the staff at Ebony ever sat back in 2000 and, marvelling at Michael Jackson's attempt to gradually polymorph himself into Carol Channing, thought to themselves, "Boy, did we get THAT one wrong." 

James Hansen has taken a slightly different approach.  Instead of questioning his models, he simply uses his influence as head of NASA GISS to modify the historical temperature record, revising past temperatures downwards and recent temperatures upwards in order to prove that he was always right.  In other words, instead of revisiting the models to try to come up with projections that more closely match the data, he changes the data.

Hansen's approach - like Stalin's - is apparently to convince us that Michael Jackson has ALWAYS looked like one of Stephanie Meyer's gaunt, pasty-faced, sparkly vampires.  But he didn't; he once looked pretty normal.  Similarly, most of the warming in the US temperature record appears to be largely an artefact of these sorts of adjustments to the temperature record, rather than the measured temperature record itself.  This is one of the reasons that I personally do not subscribe to the notion that everyone ought to agree that the Earth's average temperature has risen over the past century.  The fact is, we don't know whether it has, because the records are no longer reliable.  That's not "conspiracy-theorist" contrarianism, it's simple historical skepticism.  The University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit has already admitted that it no longer maintains the unaltered, original, measured temperature data.  And it doesn't help when people like Michael Mann go to extraordinary lengths to design models that allegedly "prove" things that we KNOW, from empirical records, really happened - like the Medieval Warm Period and the Little Ice Age - didn't exist.  There is no substantive or ethical difference between rewriting history to disappear the MWP, and airbrushing photos to "disappear" Leon Trotsky.

And besides, how can we trust the temperature record when it is owned, maintained, and subject to regular revision by individuals who stand to profit from altering it?  That's like writing an historical treatise on the Napoleonic Wars based solely on Bonaparte's autobiography, or trying to understand the Caesar's invasion of Gaul using no primary sources other than De Bello Gallica.  These are not disinterested individuals.

Come on, folks - would you believe Al Capone's book-keeper, or would you want an independent auditor to look the numbers over?  Especially if Al wanted you to spend a trillion dollars on something he told you was absolutely necessary, based on his accounting?

You can't model a trend if you don't understand it, but you can certainly alter data records to make your model look more accurate.  Maybe the editors of Ebony should take a leaf from Hansen's book and spend all their time altering the contrast on all of the pre-2000 photographs of Michael Jackson and photoshopping in that epic chin-cleft. 

Could take a while, and be really expensive; there are an awful lot of pics of the Unigloved One out there.  And Ebony's editors don't have Hansen's US government sinecure, a guaranteed six-figure include, or endless time on their hands.  Besides, they don't have a motive; after all, their entire weltanschauung, and their funding, doesn't depend on whether they can convince the world of the accuracy of their model for predicting the evolution of pop star physiognomy.

But Hansen's does.

Cheers,

//Don//


Saturday, April 14, 2012

1 March 2011 – Lessons in opportunity cost

Colleagues,

I find it interesting that European countries are starting to take a closer look at some of their long-standing “green” policies from a stand-point of cost-benefit analysis.  This is a refreshing change from the usual political arguments for investing in green power.

We’ve heard a lot about “green jobs” and “the green economy” over the past few years, especially from south of the border.  The thing is, when “green jobs” programmes based on renewable energy technologies (other than hydroelectric power) are evaluated on a level economic playing field against conventional energy technologies, they rarely come out on the positive side of the ledger.  We got the first inkling of that from Spain (which President Obama had touted as a model for the adoption of green energy technologies) with a research report published at the University of King Juan Carlos in March 2009.  This study concluded that “Despite its hyper-aggressive (expensive and extensive) ‘green jobs’ policies it appears that Spain likely has created a surprisingly low number of jobs, two thirds of which came in construction, fabrication and installation, one quarter in administrative positions, marketing and projects engineering, and just one out of ten jobs has been created at the more permanent level of actual operation and maintenance of the renewable sources of electricity.”; that “since 2000 Spain spent €571,138 to create each ‘green job’, including subsidies of more than €1 million per wind industry job”; and that “the programs creating those jobs also resulted in the destruction of nearly 110,500 jobs elsewhere in the economy, or 2.2 jobs destroyed for every ‘green job’ created.” (Note A)

The Spanish report, not surprisingly, attracted a firestorm of vituperation from those with an ideological or financial stake in renewable energy technologies, but it should have come as no surprise to anyone who has looked at actual cost-benefit data.  Without taking into consideration significant tax incentives, direct payments by governments, exemptions from regulations, and the many other benefits that the renewable-power industry enjoys (and that the conventional power industries markedly do not), “green power” - as I pointed out in a recent, yet-to-be-published paper - is still vastly more expensive per installed MWh than any conventional generation technology.

One might reasonably ask why, if “offshore wind” and “nuclear” generation are so close in terms of dollar investment per kWh of installed capacity, we don’t emphasize wind more.  The answer is twofold.  First, wind power is intermittent; the average capacity factor for a turbine in high-wind areas is 25% (I addressed this in my 3 Feb CoP on wind power in Texas).  So in order to generate 1 MW of power, you have to install four 1 MW turbines.  That quadruples the cost, and the quadrupling is not reflected in the chart.  The second reason is because turbines freeze in the winter.(Note C)  It would not be considered acceptable for a coal, hydro, oil, gas or nuclear power plant to drop off line for several weeks in the winter, as the wind farm operated north of Bathurst by GDF Suez Energy did, because of “ice build-up”.  The only reason that thousands of New Brunswickers didn’t freeze to death is because New Brunswick has reliable conventional power available.

  Figure 1: Dollars per installed kWh for various energy sources. (Note B)

But those are operational concerns.  Let’s get back to the economics of the problem.  The Spanish study, as I said, did not go over well with the proponents of wind and solar power, and there was much wailing and gnashing of teeth.  But it did break the logjam.  In May of last year, the Istituto Bruno Leoni in Milan published a study entitled “Are Green Jobs Real Jobs?” that looked at Italy’s experience with mandated and government-subsidized renewable energy programs.(Note D)  This study, which also incorporated a look at the experience with green power in Denmark, Germany and Spain, concluded that the opportunity cost of “green energy” investments in Italy was very high: “the same amount of capital that creates one job in the green sector, would create 6.9 or 4.8 [jobs] if invested in the industry or the economy in general.” (Note D, p. 40)  The principal reason for this, they conclude, is that the vast majority of “green sector” jobs are temporary because once the infrastructure is in place, the bulk of the work has been done.  In other words, “green power”, while expensive, isn’t necessarily bad, but it is not an “industry” as such, and it is inaccurate to paint the “green economy” as likely to create permanent employment.  It is, in fact, more likely to create temporary employment at the cost of amounts of capital that would create much more, and much more permanent, employment if invested in other sectors of the economy.  This conclusion reinforced the conclusions of the Spanish study.

And now, as of yesterday, we have a third study to back up the results from the other two - this one from the bastion of “green policy”, the UK itself.  Verso Economics, working from government and energy industry data, has concluded that investments in renewable energy in Scotland (principally wind power, as Scotland has no lack of wind) have cost 3.7 jobs for every one job created in the UK as a whole - despite favourable tax and regulatory exemptions and massive direct investments from taxpayers in both Scotland and the broader UK.(Note E)  The Scottish government disputed the report, arguing (a) that heavy investments by foreign companies in renewable power in Scotland prove the economic viability of renewable energy (a non sequitur if there ever was one), and (b) that the Verso report ignores the impact of “climate change”.(Note F) 

Actually, the UK report doesn’t ignore climate change; it notes that in addition the £330,000,000 in direct subsidies that renewable power in Scotland has received, the exemption that renewable power projects in the UK enjoy from the national “climate change levy” has deprived Her Majesty’s coffers of approximately £100,000,000 in revenue.  This brings the overall cost to taxpayers of these projects to just shy of half a billion pounds.  This must rankle in a winter when large expanses of the UK’s wind farms have either stood idle due to the drop in winds that tends to accompany extremely low temperatures - or have had to be electrically heated in order to enable them to turn at all, meaning that, for days on end, the turbines were in fact consuming power from the grid instead of producing it.(Note G)

It’s interesting to see renewable energy projects increasingly being evaluated on a basis of costs vs. benefits, and to see the claims of their proponents being subjected to at least some degree of statistical scrutiny.  As money gets scarcer over the coming years and taxpayers become ever more grudging of government’s grip on their shrinking earnings, we may see a little more arithmetically literate scepticism of the promise of the “green economy,” and - just perhaps - a corresponding tightening of the purse strings. 

Cheers,


B) Data from US Energy Information Administration [http://www.eia.doe.gov/].  IGCC = Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle; NGCC = Natural Gas Combined Cycle.  STG = Solar Thermal Generation.  SPVG = Solar Photo-Voltaic Generation. Based on this chart, one might reasonably ask why NGCC is not the dominant electrical generation technology in the US.  The answer is operating cost.  In the US, natural gas is scarce and expensive, while coal – like uranium – is cheap and plentiful.  NGCC turbines are expensive but efficient; their virtue lies in quick start-up, which makes them ideal as backup generation systems for unreliable or intermittent power sources, like wind.  And yes, this chart appeared as Figure 19 in a paper I wrote examining the anthropogenic global warming thesis.




Wednesday, April 11, 2012

Donald A. Neill - LinkedIn Page and Publications

Colleagues,

I've recently discovered LinkedIn.  It's a great tool for listing your CV and publications online.

My page is a bit of a work in progress, but here it is:

Donald A. Neill

And just for giggles, here's my publication list, current as of four hours or so ago.  Haven't put most of these on the LinkedIn page because they have to be entered individually, and I just don't have the time right now.

-----------------------------------------------

Donald Alexander NEILL, CD, OMMM, Ph.D.

PUBLICATIONS


NEILL, DONALD A., Neil Chuka, and Brad Gladman. “Strategic Implications for ISAF of some post-2014 Scenarios”, DRDC CORA Letter Report 2012-(TBD), 2 April 2012 (22 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, DONALD A., and ELIZABETH SPEED.  “The Strategic Implications of China’s Dominance of the Global Rare Earth Elements (REE) Market”, DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum 2012-(TBD), April 2012 (86 pp). Peer-reviewed.


CHUKA, NEIL and DONALD A. Neill. “Implications for ISAF of an Altered UN Mandate”, DRDC CORA Letter Report 2012-045, 9 March 2012 (16 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


SPEED, S.E., and D.A. NEILL.  “After Kim Jong-il: Some Observations”, DRDC CORA Letter Report 2011-218, 22 December 2011 (5 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


SPEED, S.E., and D.A. NEILL.  “The Strategic Implications of China’s Dominance of the Global Rare Earth Elements Market”, DRDC CORA Letter Report 2011-222, 22 December 2011 (22 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


CHUKA, N. and NEILL, D.A.. “A research and analysis framework for a strategic-level lessons learned process”, DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum 2011-210, November 2011 (88 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A. “China’s Evolving Nuclear Posture: Part One – Background and Benchmark”, DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum 2011-148, September 2011 (49 pp).  Peer-reviewed.
            http://pubs.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/inbasket/DRP_CORA.120113_1033.TM2011-148_A1b.pdf


NEILL, D.A. “China’s Evolving Nuclear Posture: Part Two – The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy”, DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum 2011-156, September 2011 (117 pp).  Peer-reviewed.
            http://pubs.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/inbasket/DRP_CORA.120113_1423.TM2011-156_A1b.pdf


CHUKA, N. and NEILL, D.A.. “A research and analysis framework for a strategic-level lessons learned process”, DRDC CORA Letter Report 2011-125, 11 August 2011 (64 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A. “Libya’s Chemical Weapons – Status and Risks”, DRDC CORA Letter Report 2011-069, SECRET (AUSCANZUKUS EYES ONLY), 31 May 2011 (23 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


SPEED, S.E., D.A. NEILL, and K. CHRISTENSEN.  “New Military Capabilities in Asia”, DRDC CORA Letter Report 2011-051, 28 April 2011 (5 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A.  “The Evolving Arctic Operating Environment: Implications for Defence Planning”, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Volume 13, Issue 2 (Winter 2011).  35 pp.  Peer-reviewed.
            http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/303


NEILL, D.A.  “ ‘The Business of the Botanist’: Growth and Change in DND, 2000-2010”, DRDC CORA Letter Report LR 2010-243, 15 November 2010 (24 pp).  Peer-reviewed.  This paper was included as Annex O, Appendix 5 to the Report on Transformation submitted to DM/CDS by General Leslie’s Transformation Team on 6 July 2011.


NEILL, D.A.  “Considerations for Structuring and Populating a Strategic Critical Technology List for DND/CF”, DRDC CORA Letter Report LR 2010-112, August 2010 (38 pp).  INTERNAL (See OR-17).


NEILL, D.A., “Constraints on the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling and/or use of Non-Conventional Weapons”, Memorandum to CORA A/CS, 26 August 2010.  (8 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “Ancillary Considerations for Developing a SCTL”, Memorandum to DG CORA, 19 July 2010.  (24 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “Considerations for Structuring and Populating a Strategic Critical Technology List for DND/CF: A presentation to COS ADM(S&T), July 2010”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Note TN 2010-180.  29 pp. (See OR-17)


NEILL, D.A., “Considerations for Structuring and Populating a Strategic Critical Technology List for DND/CF”, Presentation to COS ADM(S&T), 7 July 2010 (17 pp).(See TN-11).


NEILL, D.A., “Methodology for Population of a SCTL for Defence”, Briefing Note for COS ADM(S&T), 14 July 2010 (7 pp).


SPEED, S.E., and D.A. NEILL, “(U) Estimate of North Korean Military Power”, SJS Strategic Estimate, Secret/CEO, SJS Strategic Estimate, 5 May 2010 (13 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


SPEED, S.E., D.A. NEILL, K.D. CHRISTENSEN and S. ZHANG.  “(U) Chinese Military Power: A Preliminary Strategic Assessment”, DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum 2010-093, Secret/CEO, May 2010 (82 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


SPEED, S.E., D.A. NEILL, and K. CHRISTENSEN.  “(U) Estimate of Chinese Military Power”, DRDC CORA Letter Report 2010-038, Secret/CEO, SJS Strategic Estimate, March 2010 (12) pages.  Peer-reviewed.


SPEED, S.E., D.A. NEILL, and K. CHRISTENSEN.  “(U) Strategic Assessment of Chinese Military Power”, DRDC CORA LETTER REPORT 2010-037, Secret/AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA EYES ONLY, CDI Intelligence Assessment, March 2010 (17 pp). Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., “Characteristics of Successful Organizations: Reverse-Engineering the 1944 OSS Simple Sabotage Field Manual Through the Lens of Classical Organization Theory”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Memorandum, TM2009-051, November 2009 (46 pp).  Peer-reviewed.
            http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc96/p532479_A1b.pdf


NEILL, D.A., “ ‘Bombing the Moon’: The LCROSS experiment in the context of arms control and international law”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Note TN 2009-047, October 2009.


NEILL, D.A., “A strategic framework for exploring alternative energy options in DND/CF”, Unclassified, Presentation to the Canada-US Army Operational Research Symposium, Center for Army Analysis, Virginia, 15-17 September 2009.


NEILL, D.A., “ ‘Attaining Strategic Effect for the Nation’: Strategic Analysis in Support of the CDS Force Employment Directive”, Unclassified Research Proposal, 21 August 2009 (7 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “A Research and Analysis Framework for a Strategic-Level Lessons Learned Process”, Unclassified, Presentation to the Canada-US Army Operational Research Symposium, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, 24-26 August 2009.


NEILL, D.A., “A strategic framework for exploring alternative energy options in DND/CF”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Memorandum, TM2009-010, March 2009 (78 pp).  Peer-reviewed.
            http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc94/p531344_a1b.pdf


NEILL, D.A., “Surviving 2012: Options for coping with the CWC final destruction deadlines”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Memorandum, TM2009-009, February 2009 (70 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., “The Future of the Chemical Weapons Convention:  A presentation to the Global Futures Forum The US Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, California 23-25 September 2008”, Unclassified, Published as CORA Technical Note TN 2008-038, October 2008.


NEILL, D.A., “The Graduate Level of War: Continuity and change in US counter-insurgency strategy”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Memorandum, TM2008-041, October 2008 (101 pp).  Peer-reviewed.
            http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc94/p530518_a1b.pdf


NEILL, D.A., B.W. Lombardi and R. Heide, “Thoughts on Strategic Assessment: 'Strategic Reassessment: From Long-Range Planning to Future Strategy and Forces,' Joint Operations Symposium, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 4-5 June 2008”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Note TN 2008-035, September 2008.


NEILL, D.A., “America and Iraq”, Unclassified, Briefing Note for the Deputy Minister of National Defence, 2 May 2008 (4 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “Some Observations on US Casualty Statistics from the War On Terror”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Memorandum, TM2008-014, May 2008 (50 pp).   Peer-reviewed.


SMOLYNEC, G., NEILL, D.A., GLADMAN B., et al., “Defence Scientists’ Reflections on CFD’s Future Security Environment 2007-2030, Part One”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Note TN 2008-01, February 2008.


A. KELLETT, N. Bjelakovic, B. Lombardi, A. Minkov, D. Neill, E. Ouellet and C. Yeung, “The Involvement of Key States in Afghanistan: A Strategic Assessment”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Report TR 2008-01, January 2008 (136 pp).  2 Chapters (12 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, DONALD A. “Riot control and incapacitating agents: ‘A very awkward situation’”, in Ralf Trapp, editor, OPCW Academic Forum Conference Proceedings, The Hague, The Netherlands: Institute of International Relations (2008), Unclassified, pp 197-208 (11 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., “Topics for the Second Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference”, Unclassified, Presentation to the CORA Annual General Meeting, September 2007;  Published as CORA Technical Note TN 2007-31, December 2007.


N. BJELAKOVIC, B. GREENE, T. JUNEAU, A. KELLETT, B. LOMBARDI, D.A. NEILL, E. OUELLET, “Iran’s Nuclear Challenges: Assessing America’s Options”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Note TN 2007-29, November 2007.


NEILL, D.A., “Riot Control and Incapacitating Chemical Agents Under the Chemical Weapons Convention”, Unclassified,  Presentation to the OPCW Academic Forum, The Hague, September 2007; Published as CORA Technical Note TN 2007-32, December 2007.


NEILL, D.A., “Riot Control and Incapacitating Chemical Agents Under the Chemical Weapons Convention”, Unclassified, Presentation to Wilton Park conference on security, Wilton Park, UK, September, 2007. 


NEILL, D.A.  “First to Fail, First to Succeed: Albania Destroys Its Chemical Weapons”, Unclassified, D Strat A Background Paper, 19 July 2007 (6 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., “Poppy for Medicine: The Senlis Council Proposal”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Note TN 2007-19 (Issue Brief for Chief Defence Intelligence), July 2007.


NEILL, D.A., “Candidate Thompson”, Unclassified, D Strat A Background Paper, 27 June 2007 (14 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A.  “Riot Control and Incapacitating Chemical Agents Under the Chemical Weapons Convention”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Memorandum, TM2007-22, May 2007 (47 pp).  Peer-reviewed.
            http://pubs.drdc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc63/p528121.pdf


NEILL, D.A.  “The Chemical Weapons Convention: Topics for the Second Review Conference”, Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, Volume 5, 10th Anniversary Special Edition (May 2007), Unclassified, pp 14-18 (5 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A.  “The Chemical Weapons Convention at the Second Review Conference, and Beyond”, Unclassified, CORA Technical Memorandum, TM2007-04, April 2007 (119 pp).  Peer-reviewed.  (Winner, 2007 ORBITA Award for Best Scientific Paper)


NEILL, D.A., “The Chemical Weapons Convention: Topics for the Second Review Conference”, Unclassified, Presentation to the NATO Senior Group on Proliferation Seminar on Non-Proliferation, Vilnius, Lithuania, 19 April 2007.


NEILL, D.A., “Visit of Rogelio Pfirter, Director General of the OPCW”, Unclassified, Briefing Note and Talking Points for the Deputy Minister, 02 March 2007 (3 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “Visit of Rogelio Pfirter, Director General of the OPCW”, Unclassified, Briefing Note and Talking Points for Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy),  02 March 2007 (10 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “Another Improvised Chemical Attack in Iraq”, Unclassified, Directorate of Strategic Analysis Issue Brief, 21 February 2007 (3 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “The 2nd Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference”, Unclassified, Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence, 26 February 2007 (2 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “China Tests an ASAT”, Unclassified, Directorate of Strategic Analysis Issue Brief, 19 January 2007 (12 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “Insurgent Use of Improvised Chemical Weapons”, Unclassified, Directorate of Strategic Analysis Issue Brief, 15 January 2007 (3 pp).


NEILL, D.A., “The Strategic Implications of a Chinese ASAT”, Unclassified, Briefing Note for the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff, 26 January 2007 (3 pp).


NEILL, D.A.  “Limits of Strategic Analysis”, Unclassified, in Strategic Assessment 2006/07, ADM(Pol), D Strat A, December 2006, pp 143-145 (3 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A. “Challenging the Titan,” Unclassified, in Strategic Assessment 2006/07, ADM (Pol), D Strat A, December 2006, pp 19-25 (7 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A. “WMD Proliferation: North Korea’s Lesson,” Unclassified, in Strategic Assessment 2006/07, ADM (Pol), D Strat A, December 2006, pp 87-91 (4 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., “Canada Supports OPCW Inspector Training”, Unclassified, Chemical Defence Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 1 (March 2007), p 12. (Note: this is an uncredited article derived from an OPCW press release (PR95 dated 11 December 2006) that was drafted by D.A. Neill and forwarded to the OPCW Technical Secretariat by the Canadian Delegation to The Hague.


NEILL, D.A., “OPCW Inspector Training at DRDC Suffield”, Unclassified, Briefing Note for the Deputy Minister of National Defence, 1 December 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Press Release: OPCW Director General Signs Training Arrangement with Canada”, Unclassified, for release by the OPCW Office of Press and Public Affairs, December 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Talking Points: Signing Ceremony 8 December 2006 – MOU Governing the Provision of Training to OPCW Personnel at DRDC Suffield”, Unclassified, Brief and Talking Points for the Canadian Ambassador to the OPCW, 1 December 2006.


NEILL, D.A. “United Kingdom,” Unclassified, with P. Archambault and B. Lombardi, in Western Defence Trends 2006, ADM (Pol), D Strat A, November 2006, pp 23-28 (6 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., “Northeast Asian Security Issues”, Unclassified, Briefing Note, Visit of General Yoshida, COS JASDF, 22 November 2006 (talking points included).


NEILL, D.A., “Summary – Amending the CWC Schedules of Chemicals”, Unclassified,  background note for the Canadian Delegation to the 11th Conference of CWC States Parties, 16 November 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Summary – Destruction Deadlines for Old Chemical Weapons”, Unclassified, background note for the Canadian Delegation to the 11th Conference of CWC States Parties, 16 November 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Summary – End-points of Destruction”, Unclassified, background note for the Canadian Delegation to the 11th Conference of CWC States Parties, 16 November 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Summary – Enhancing Article VI Verification”, Unclassified, background note for the Canadian Delegation to the 11th Conference of CWC States Parties, 16 November 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Summary – Extending and Strengthening the Chemical Weapons Convention”, Unclassified, background note for the Canadian Delegation to the 11th Conference of CWC States Parties, 16 November 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Summary – Low Concentration Limits for Schedule 2A and 2A* Chemicals”, Unclassified, background note for the Canadian Delegation to the 11th Conference of CWC States Parties, 16 November 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Summary – Other Chemical Producing Facilities”, Unclassified, background note for the Canadian Delegation to the 11th Conference of CWC States Parties, 16 November 200


NEILL, D.A., “Summary – Transfer discrepancies”, Unclassified, background note for the Canadian Delegation to the 11th Conference of CWC States Parties, 16 November 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Summary – Transfers of Schedule 3 Chemicals to States Not Party to the Convention”, Unclassified, background note for the Canadian Delegation to the 11th Conference of CWC States Parties, 16 November 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “The 2006 Mid-Term Elections”, Unclassified, background brief, 8 November 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Implications of the North Korean Nuclear Test”, Unclassified, Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence, 10 October 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “International Response to the North Korean Nuclear Test”, Unclassified, Briefing Note for the Minister of National Defence, 16 October 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “The Chemical Weapons Convention at the 2nd Review Conference, and Beyond”, Unclassified, presentation to the Center for Security and Defence Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, 19 October 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention by DND: Emerging Problems”, Unclassified, presentation to the Advanced Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Officer Course, CFB Borden, 22 September 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Policy Guidance: Procedures for Reporting and Destroying Chemical Weapons Discovered at DND/CF Facilities”, Unclassified, Amendment 1, Departmental Policy Document, 2 May 2006.


NEILL, D.A. “The Evolution of Organizational Structures, Policies and Procedures for Crisis Management: NATO, Kosovo and the Transition from Collective Defence to Collective Security,” Doctoral dissertation, University of Kent at Canterbury (Brussels School of International Studies), 11 April 2006, Unclassified, 267 pp. Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., “The Bush Doctrine and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Unclassified, presentation to the DND University Forum, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, 15 February 2006.


NEILL, D.A., “Trends in countering the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Unclassified, presentation to the Security and Defence Forum, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, 13 December 2005.


NEILL, D.A. “Counter-proliferation in the first and second Bush Administrations,” Unclassified, in Strategic Assessment 2005, ADM (Pol), D Strat A, November 2005, pp 72-77 (5 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., and E. Speed, “China’s growing regional influence”, Unclassified, in Strategic Assessment 2005, ADM (Pol), D Strat A, November 2005, pp 27-33 (7 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A. “China versus the Internet,” Unclassified, D STRAT A Background Paper, 19 October 2005, (20 pp).  Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., “Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation in the Department of National Defence”, Unclassified, presentation to the Advanced Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Officer Course, CFB Borden, October 2005.


NEILL, D.A., “Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation in the Department of National Defence”, Unclassified, presentation to the staff and faculty of the Canadian Forces Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence School, CFB Borden; and to senior staff of the Canadian Forces Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Company, CFB Trenton, July 2005.


NEILL, D.A., -----, SECRET, Departmental Policy Document, May 2005.


NEILL, D.A., “Challenges of a Challenge Inspection at an Article III(1)(d) Facility”, Unclassified, presentation to the Joint European Union / Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons seminar on Challenge Inspections, Vienna, June 2004.


NEILL, D.A., -----, SECRET, presentation to the scientific staff of Defence R&D Canada Suffield, Suffield, Alberta, May 2004.


NEILL, D.A., “Emergency Medical Support to International Inspectors”, Unclassified, Briefing Note for MND, 2 Apr 04.


NEILL, D.A., -----, SECRET, Memorandum for Director Science and Technology – Human Performance, February 2004.


NEILL, D.A., “The Nature of NATO”, Unclassified, Defense News, 5-11 August 2002, p. 10.


NEILL, D.A., “Ethics and the Military Corporation”, Unclassified, Canadian Military Journal, Volume 1, Number 1, Spring 2000, pp. 27-40.  Peer-reviewed.
            http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo1/no1/doc/27-40-eng.pdf


NEILL, D.A., and H.P. Klepak, “Are there lessons for India and Pakistan from the Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rivalry?” Unclassified, Report for the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa, Ontario, March 2000). 60 pp. EXTERNAL
            http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/assets/pdfs/argentina-brazil_klepak_neill.pdf


NEILL, D.A. “Mutabilis in Mobili: Leading and Managing Change in DND and the CF”, Unclassified, VCDS paper on Departmental strategic change management.  n.d.  posted on VCDS website as a DND/CF “strategic document” 2000-2006.


NEILL, D.A. “Sustaining the Total Force: Realigning the Supplementary Reserve for the 21st Century”, Unclassified,  VCDS strategic paper on Reserve force restructure.  n.d.  VCDS website [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/Reserve-Issues/docs/VCDS_FSG-Supp_Res_e.doc].


NEILL, D.A., “To BMD or not to BMD: Canadian Policy Options on National Missile Defence”, Unclassified, research paper for the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans’ Affairs and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, January 2000.


NEILL, D.A., “VCDS Force Structure Guidance: Manning Principles for Mobilization”, Unclassified,   VCDS strategic paper on Reserve force restructure.  n.d. VCDS website [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/Reserve-Issues/docs/manning-principles_e.doc].


NEILL, D.A., “VCDS Force Structure Guidance: Strategic Warning for National Mobilization”, Unclassified,   VCDS strategic paper on Reserve force restructure.  n.d.  VCDS website [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/Reserve-Issues/docs/Strat-Warning-English.doc].


NEILL, D.A. “Rethinking the Total Force: Aligning the Defence Team for the 21st Century”, Unclassified, 26 November 1999.  VCDS strategic paper on Reserve force restructure.  n.d. VCDS website [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/vcds-exec/pubs/reserve-issues/intro_e.asp].


NEILL, D.A. “Lessons of Operation ROCKHOUND: The Composite Air Defence Battery in Joint and Combined Amphibious Operations,” Unclassified, US Army Air Defence Artillery Magazine Online, May 1999.


NEILL, D.A. “Ancestral Voices: The Influence of the Ancients on the Military Thought of the 17th and 18th Centuries,” Unclassified, Journal of Military History, Volume 62 Number 3, July 1998, pp. 487-520. Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A., with M. Godefroy and K. Sutherland, "Air Defence Artillery in the Canadian Army,” Unclassified, US Army Air Defence Artillery Journal, Spring 1998.


NEILL, D.A., "Prospect and Peril: Canada and Asia-Pacific Security", Unclassified, presentation to the United Services Institute, Moncton, New Brunswick, 29 January 1998.


NEILL, D.A. “Strategic Review: South Asia”, CONFIDENTIAL, Director General Policy Operations background paper, 1996.


NEILL, D.A. “Revising Nuclear Strategy: Threats and Postures in the New World Order,” Unclassified, Occasional Paper No. 7, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, Department of Strategic Studies, March 1994. Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A. “The Battle of Copenhagen 1801: Fischer’s Line and Weights of Fire”, Unclassified, United States Naval Institute Proceedings (copyright purchased 1993, but not published).


NEILL, D.A. “Dung, Dust and Cordite: The Royal Canadian Artillery in Sicily, 1943”, Unclassified, Esprit de Corps: The Mag­azine of the Canadian Military, Autumn 1993 (in two parts: Volume 3 Issue 1, Volume 3 Issue 2).


NEILL, D.A., "The Price of Alliance: Denmark and Armed Neutrality, 1801", Unclassified, presentation to the Society for Military History, Annual Conference, Kingston, Ontario, 23 May 1993.


NEILL, D.A., "Le désarmement nucléaire au sein de l'ancien URSS", Unclassified, for the Base Commander's Conference Series, CFB St-Jean, 19 February 1993.


NEILL, D.A. “Limited War and the Gulf Conflict: the Conundrum of Res­traint,” Unclassified, Occasional Paper No. 1, Department of Strategic Studies, CMR, January 1993. Peer-reviewed.


NEILL, D.A. “New Direction for Army”, Unclassified, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 May 92.


NEILL, D.A. “Air Force Builds in Flexibility”, Unclassified, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 April 92.


NEILL, D.A. “Back to the Basics: Defence Interests and Defence Policy in Canada,” Unclassified, Canadian Defence Quarterly, Winter 1991. Peer-reviewed.
            http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/cdq/Neill%20December%201991.PDF


NEILL, D.A., "Dung, Dust and Cordite: The Royal Canadian Artillery in Sicily, 1943", Unclassified, presentation to the Sir Wilfred Laurier University Conference on Canadian Military History, 9 December 1991.


NEILL, D.A. “One Hundred Tanks a Day: Air Defence Lessons in the Gulf War”, Unclassified, Gunner Bulletin, 1991.


NEILL, D.A., and H.P. KLEPAK, «  À Chaque Scud son Patriot (en principe) » , Unclassified, La Presse, 16 February 1991.


NEILL, D.A. “Challenge in the Skies”, Unclassified, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 December 90.


NEILL, D.A. “Emerging from the Franco Legacy”, Unclassified, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 December 90.


NEILL, D.A. “American Technostrategy and the Nuclear Arms Race: Evaluating the Evangelista Model,” Unclassified, M.A. Thesis, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, August 1990, 150 pp. Peer-reviewed.